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In Western democracies, military personnel rarely
engage in protest, whether political or labour related
(Langton, 1984). Luckily so, one could argue – mili-
tary personnel getting on the barricades in order to
achieve political goals has often meant a serious crisis
for the democratic order, like in Turkey in 2016 or in
Spain a few decades ago. However, even the modes of
protest which are widely accepted as legitimate rarely
take place within the military. By and large, this is not
a voluntary choice. While the severity of the rules dif-
fer from country to country, all Western democracies
place some kind of legal restrictions on protest behav-
iour among their military personnel (Nolte, 2003).
Additionally, the military remains an organization
with a specific organizational culture which makes the
route to protest complicated, if not impossible. The
motivation behind these restrictions concerns the
irreconcilability of protest with military tasks, and,
more broadly, the democratic order.
At the same time it is a paradox that those who
defend democracy with their lives do not get to enjoy
it to the full (Sugin, 1987). While this might be an
interesting theoretical and judicial question, for mili-
tary personnel there are important practical ramifica-
tions. They, just like all other citizens, sometimes face
situations which cause discontent. While only a
minority of citizens tends to engage in protest, it
being even less available to military personnel might
make them unusually weak in the face of social and
economic challenges.
In this article, we focus on protest by military per-
sonnel in Western democracies. Protest itself can take
many forms, and can be divided into actions within
norms of existing social systems, like petitioning or
taking part in a demonstration, and actions which
violate the law, like illegal protest or civil disobedience
(Wright et al., 1990). It remains important to note
that, often, a reaction to discontent implies different
kinds of behaviour, such as silence, remaining passive,
exiting the situation altogether or even resorting to
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anti-social behaviour, as forwarded by Hirschman
(1970) and those who built upon his framework.
Such forms of behaviour are subject to extensive
research, also within the military, but lie largely
beyond the scope of this article. 
We aim to shed light on the whole process of
engaging in protest in the specific context of the mil-
itary organization. Therefore, we cover the causes of
discontent, the restrictions military personnel expe-
rience when considering protest and the instances
when protest does materialize. To understand these
issues we review three strands of literature: (1) mili-
tary sociology, (2) social movements and trade
unions and (3) organizational science, in line with
other interdisciplinary studies on the military (e.g.
Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981: 3). 
Our focus is solely on militaries in Western
democracies. While militaries all over the world have
a similar raison d’être and tend to show a similar
organizational culture, when considering the posi-
tion of military personnel and protest specifically,
the differences in context are vast. Importantly, in
non-democracies, the rights of all citizens are limited
while the lack of democratic institutions and civil
society creates a situation profoundly different than
in Western societies. Furthermore, the role of the
military in non-democracies is different as well, as
the concept of civilian leadership is often blurred and
the military is commonly employed to protect the
authoritarian structures. Subsequently, while just as
interesting, we do not address the topic of protest in
militaries outside Western democracies.
This article consists of four sections. In the first
theoretical section we discuss three key theoretical
elements: (1) the origins of discontent in the con-
temporary Western military organization, (2) the
specific context of the military organization and (3)
the traditional arrangement for dealing with discon-
tent within this context. In the second, empirical
section we review the evidence on protest among
military personnel in Western democracies. In the
third section we assess the evidence observed so far
and identify the limitations in its scope and content.
Finally, in the fourth section we propose an encom-
passing framework for understanding this topic and
identify avenues for future research. 
Theoretical section: From discontent
to protest in the military organization 
Change and discontent in the Western
militaries
In recent decades, Western military organizations
went through a process of profound transformation.
This process influenced almost every aspect of the
military organization and resulted in shifts regarding
tasks, organizational structure, culture as well as
position of personnel. 
The literature forwards a number of factors caus-
ing this transformation. Arguably the most influen-
tial is the changing geopolitical situation. In the
period following the Second World War, Western
militaries prepared to confront the danger coming
from the Soviet Union. Then, rather abruptly, the
Cold War ended and the enemy Western militaries
were designed to deter disappeared or at least seemed
less relevant. Downsizing the military is a common
practice at the end of any major conflict – and in
that sense, the end of the Cold War was no exception
(Wong and McNally, 1994). NATO countries
immediately started reducing military spending and
planning the downsizing of their militaries
(McCalla, 1996), thereby capitalizing on the so-
called peace dividend (Intriligator, 1996; Ward and
Davis, 1992). Multiple rounds of budget cuts fol-
lowed, especially in Europe, but early in the 1990s in
the United States as well (Brasher, 2000). Aside from
budgetary pressures, numerous other factors brought
about change as well. Many of these appeared long
before the watershed moment of the fall of the Soviet
Union. For example, continuous technological
advances produced both new possibilities and new
adversaries (see Farrell and Terriff, 2002). The intro-
duction of New Public Management since the 1980s
has had a dramatic effect on (semi-)governmental
organizations. The military did not escape this trend
as business-like efficiency practices (Dandeker and
Paton, 1997; Heinecken, 2006) and market forces
(Levy, 2010) increasingly play a role within the
organization. Since the Cold War, the role of the pri-
vate sector ‘has grown exponentially and such firms
now play a pivotal role in international relations’
(Ballard, 2007: 43). Aside from management prac-
tices, ‘in society, social, cultural and legal changes
provide a less robust supporting framework for the
core values of military culture’ (Dandeker, 2001a: 5).
In particular, values of authority and obedience
became increasingly challenged after the 1960s
(Bartle, 2006b: 212). When Janowitz (1960) first
noted the convergence of the military sphere and the
civilian mainstream he referred to the relaxation of
the strict authoritarian modes of behaviour within
the military but also the changes in other practices
and rules. For instance, the recruitment of officers
became more open and started to resemble recruit-
ment in civilian society. The traditional traits of the
military leader such as personal bravery increasingly
became replaced by managerial and technological
qualities. Furthermore, rising individualism might
lead personnel to increasingly defend their own per-
sonal interests (Heinecken, 2006: 2). New norms
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inevitably find their way into the organization itself
with the recruitment of new personnel (see Van
Schilt [2011] on changing norms among different
generations of Dutch officers-to-be) but militaries
also experience direct political and societal pressure
to adapt to the new norms within broader society,
such as for example the rapidly changing public
opinion on LGBT rights (see Baunach [2012] on the
shift in US public opinion in this regard). 
Inevitably, the diverse set of pressures caused
numerous and multifaceted changes within many
Western military organizations, going far beyond the
easily visible process of downsizing. In the 1970s,
Charles Moskos (1977) proposed the so-called I/O
(institutional/occupational) model in order to
describe the social organization of the military and
the military profession. Based on the American
example, Moskos made a claim that the military was
shifting from an institutional towards an occupa-
tional model. The core idea of the institutional
model is that it is 
… legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a
purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor
of a presumed higher good. Members of an institu-
tion are often viewed as following a calling; they gen-
erally regard themselves as being different or apart
from the broader society and are so regarded by oth-
ers. … When grievances are felt, members of an
institution do not organize themselves into interest
groups. (Moskos, 1977: 42)
Contrasting with the institutional model, Moskos
presented the occupational model, as
… legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., pre-
vailing monetary rewards for equivalent competen-
cies. In a modern industrial society employees usually
enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate
salary and work conditions. … The occupational
model implies priority of self-interest rather than that
of the employing organization. A common form of
interest articulation in industrial- and increasingly
governmental-occupation is the trade union.
(Moskos, 1977: 43)
While elements of both types were present within
military organizations, Moskos (1977: 43–44)
argued that, traditionally, militaries corresponded
more to the institutional than the occupational
model and in fact opposed the organizational out-
comes of the occupational model. The signs of the
shift identified already in the 1970s included restruc-
turing of the benefits towards a market-like system
and higher levels of desertion and attrition (Moskos,
1977: 45). 
After the end of the Cold War, changes in the
military organization intensified (Booth et al., 2001:
320–321). In the 1990s, the I/O model was redevel-
oped into the postmodern military model. While the
term postmodern should be taken with much cau-
tion (see Booth et al., 2001), this framework was
repeatedly applied to understand the changes in the
Western militaries in the post-Cold War period. The
postmodern military model presents a typology of
three forms of military organization in the 20th cen-
tury: early modern (roughly until the WWII), late
modern (post-WWII) and postmodern (post-Cold
War). According to Moskos et al. (2000: 2), five key
organizational changes mark the switch towards the
postmodern military: (1) increasing contact between
the military and the civilian sphere, (2) diminution
of differences based on branch of the military, rank
and the combat/support roles, (3) the switch from
fighting to missions which are traditionally not seen
as a military task, (4) the increasing role of interna-
tional bodies which authorize and govern such mis-
sions and (5) the internationalization of military
organizations themselves, especially in Europe. 
In addition to the broader organizational
changes, a number of specific trends directly influ-
enced not only the status but also the very composi-
tion of military personnel. Most visibly, at the end of
the 20th century, more and more Western democra-
cies opted to end obligatory conscription of their
male population and abandon the model of a mass
army. In 1997, France, the birthplace of mass con-
scription, symbolically joined this growing group of
countries (see Haltiner, 1998). Furthermore, mili-
tary organizations increasingly saw greater involve-
ment of civilian employees, full integration of
women, removal of the families from the military
realm and acceptance of sexual minorities. As
stressed by Moskos (1977), in different countries
and in different segments of the military organiza-
tion changes go at a different pace or might not even
be visible. Also, the postmodern model is by no
means predictive in the sense that it guarantees that
the transformation will always go in the predicted,
postmodern direction (Moskos et al., 2000),
although developments such as the recent acceptance
of gays and lesbians within the US military show
that turning back the clock is even less realistic, given
the social and structural pressures which caused these
changes.
While both the I/O model and the postmodern
military model focused on the organizational and
cultural aspects of the changes, others stressed the
economic background of the same process. King
(2006) interpreted the transformation of the military
organization by employing the concept of economic
post-Fordism and its four crucial elements: (1) the
move from a mass to a core and peripheral 
workforce, (2) outsourcing, (3) centralization of
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management control and (4) network capitalism.
According to King (2006), these four concepts can
be used to interpret the developments within the
military organization, as both industry and military
face similar pressures to which they respond with
similar organizational solutions. 
Levy (2010) combined both the organizational-
cultural elements highlighted in the postmodern
military model and the economic elements proposed
by King (2006), in a model in which he identified a
shift from the citizen army towards the market army.
Within the market army, militarism as a value system
is subject to the market and economic calculations.
In terms of structure, the organization is becoming
post-Fordist. The hierarchy, so typical of the military,
shifts from vertical to network-centric. In terms of
culture, the military profession increasingly is look-
ing civilian. Military service is becoming commodi-
fied instead of being a civic duty. Finally, in terms of
labour relations the contractual nature of the profes-
sion produces a push towards unionization. And
while unionization might still be illegal in some
countries, Levy (2010) asserts that the commodifica-
tion of the profession in the end produces new ways
of addressing one’s grievances – including protest. 
While the models describing the transformation
of the military might differ in the way they interpret
the background of this process, the actual develop-
ments and their consequences for personnel are clear.
Those who were declared redundant had to cope
within a job market they were not necessarily quali-
fied for, while those who remained faced increased
workloads with fewer people and less funding.
Privatization and outsourcing changed not only how
military operations are conducted but also the mili-
tary profession itself. For personnel this meant facing
an erosion of the traditional elements of the military
profession including control over the unique knowl-
edge and skills which used to bring prestige and sta-
tus to the profession, the autonomy of the
professional soldier within the military domain, the
loyalty to the chain of command and the group
cohesion but also service ethics in which selfless serv-
ice and not remuneration used to be central
(Heinecken, 2014). Widespread introduction of
flexible contracts produced uncertainty and discon-
tent among personnel but also an occupational atti-
tude towards the military profession (Soeters et al.,
2006). As a result, from a place where the material
side of the job was less important and the organiza-
tion took care of the employee’s life and family, the
military has become a more civilian-like workplace
where personnel are regularly exposed to social and
economic pressures (see for instance, Heinecken,
2006). 
Interestingly, while the theoretical models which
explain the changes within the military identify the
pressures which military personnel face, they also
predict more resistance to such developments.
Already in 1977, Moskos was arguing that with the
shift from the traditional soldier’s profession to a
more civilian-like occupation, military personnel
would look for the same kind of representation and
protection as civilians do. At the time, Moskos
(1977) also referred to the increased tendency of mil-
itary personnel to bring grievances to litigation.
Especially in cases where the more usual forms of
labour activism are not available, seeking judicial
protection from measures perceived as unfair can be
seen as a form of protest. In the same period, the
attempt to unionize US military personnel occurred.
This was widely interpreted as a sign of the looming
shift towards the occupational model. Notably, while
unionization of American military personnel failed
to materialize, in many other countries trade unions
did gain a foothold within military organizations
(see Bartle and Heinecken, 2006). According to
Heinecken (2006: 2) the clash between a deteriorat-
ing labour position and increasing operational
demands causes increased interest in military repre-
sentation and unionism, a trend partially fostered by
the rise of societal individualism. Levy (2010) goes
even further and highlights increased activism, not
only regarding the socio-economic position of per-
sonnel but also the policy regarding the deployment
of the military forces. 
At the same time, while pressures might call for
more activism, it has been noted that the end of con-
scription might in fact impede protest. Vasquez
(2005) argued that collective action aimed at pre-
venting military casualties is more likely to occur in
democracies with conscription than in democracies
with a volunteer force. Namely, conscription results
in more citizens with political power being influ-
enced by the risks of combat, which promotes
engagement in activities to curb such risks.
Whether military personnel will indeed become
increasingly assertive remains the question. Engaging
in protest and activism is by no means an easy
process, even in the civilian world, let alone in the
military. And while the military might be turning
more civilian, most authors agree that military
organizations will never become just another compa-
ny. Under pressure or not, military personnel will
have to deal with their discontent in a very specific
context. 
Context of  the military organization:
Working, living and protesting within the
military 
Those who write about the military often refer to it
as a place that is different from the rest of society. In
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understanding the effect of the military context on
protest we focus on two important aspects. First, the
military environment is unique and vastly influen-
tial. Hence, military personnel often find it difficult
to operate independently of their organization, even
when engaging in activities which are unrelated to
the military tasks. Second, a number of typical orga-
nizational characteristics have consequences for
engaging in protest, usually by suppressing or limit-
ing it.
Military uniqueness and exceptional
impact on individuals. While most organiza-
tions and organized groups in society have their spe-
cific cultures and practices, the military is often
represented as being a world apart – because of its
customs and rules distinct from the mainstream
civilian world, its historical persistence and the rela-
tively large number of people who (used to) work
within it. 
It is well known that soldiers are routinely trained
to be different than citizens. Goffman’s (1961) theo-
ry of ‘total institutions’ has been widely applied to
understand the position of military personnel. They
often find themselves within a place ‘where a large
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the
wider society for an appreciable period of time,
together lead an enclosed, formally administered
round of life’ (Goffman, 1991 [1961]: 11). Many
military sub-organizations, army barracks for exam-
ple, belong to a type of total institution formed to
pursue a work-related goal. While many of the mili-
tary institutions are nowadays semi-total rather than
total institutions (Van Schilt, 2011: 32), many char-
acteristics of life within a total institution still apply.
For example, all aspects of life conform to institu-
tional rules and regulations while many of the habits
and manners typical for the outside world are reject-
ed. The line between private and professional lives is
blurred and those who have spent a long time with-
in the military find it difficult to continue life in the
civilian world. 
Segal (1986) and Soeters et al. (2006) also high-
light the great personal impact of military service.
The military is, they argue, just like family, a greedy
institution which takes a high toll on individuals in
terms of loyalty, commitment, time and energy. The
risks involved in military service, frequent mobility
and prolonged stays abroad all make working within
the military distinctively different than working else-
where in society. 
While the transformation of the military organi-
zation described in the earlier section highlighted a
move towards the civilian mainstream, most authors
dealing with the military stress the need to maintain
military uniqueness in spite of the pressures for
change and adaptation (see for instance, Boëne,
1990; Dandeker, 2001b). When compared with the
civilian society, the military continues to be typified
by numerous characteristics with a far-stretching
impact on those working within it, in spite of a cer-
tain convergence with the civilian mainstream (see
for instance, Booth et al., 2001: 333–334).
Organizational characteristics and
protest. While there are many elements which
make the military unique, several important charac-
teristics have particular ramifications on whether and
how personnel can engage in protest: military loyal-
ty, bureaucracy and hierarchy, discipline and author-
itarianism, unit cohesion and the unique legal
position of personnel.
Military loyalty is one of the most important and
most often mentioned military values (Coleman,
2009; Robinson, 2008). According to Winslow
(1998), loyalty is instigated at all levels of the mili-
tary organization as it supports its crucial collective
goals. 
At the level of the military organization as a
whole, Heinecken (2006) describes loyalty as a recip-
rocal relationship where government serves as a
guardian of the personnel’s interest while personnel
trust their employers and need no independent rep-
resentation to fight for their interests. More often,
loyalty concerns the lower level of operational units.
Connor (2007: 71–72) argues that ‘it is a truism that
small groups of soldiers fight for each other first, and
higher ideals second’. Connor (2007: 69) also sees
striking similarities between this kind of military loy-
alty and family loyalty and points out that military
training commonly aims to place individuals within
a new family. What are the consequences of such
strong loyalty in situations where military personnel
experience discontent? 
Importantly, Coleman (2009: 111) notes that
‘Given that military personnel place their lives at risk
in doing their duty, and that these personnel know
that in combat situations they are expected to
demonstrate extreme, possibly unlimited, loyalty to
their colleagues by placing their lives in each other’s
hands, it should hardly be surprising that these same
extreme perceptions of the demands of loyalty tend
to be extended to more ordinary circumstances’.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how loyalty forged
under the most difficult circumstances can suddenly
be switched off once personnel return to a non-com-
bat work environment. While in such circumstances
protest might be actually acceptable as it does not
hurt key military tasks, military loyalty commonly
works to restrain protest, both at the organizational
level (Heinecken, 2009) and when dealing with
wrongdoings of fellow service(wo)men (Coleman,
6
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2009: 111). In such situations, loyalty leads person-
nel to defend their colleagues and organization, espe-
cially if the perceived attack is coming from the
outside society (Kleinig, 2001: 10). 
Unit cohesion has been defined as ‘the bonding
together of members of an organization in such a
way as to sustain their will and commitment to each
other, their unit and the mission’ (Johns, 1984: 4). It
stands closely to loyalty felt for one’s nearest col-
leagues, also because loyalty has the most meaning
within a small unit where success and survival rest on
cohesion (Connor, 2007). In the military, cohesion
has been hailed as a crucial value as it is deemed nec-
essary for maintaining unit integrity, enhances per-
formance and supports mission motivation (Siebold,
2006).
The concept, background and the role of unit
cohesion were described in detail by Shils and
Janowitz (1948). Their study examined cohesion and
disintegration in the German Wehrmacht during the
Second World  War based on documents and inter-
views conducted with German prisoners of war. The
authors’ fascination was rooted in the fact that in
spite of their desperate position the units in which
POWs served remained surprisingly stable until the
very end of the war. According to Shils and Janowitz
(1948), the unit cohesion played a key role in achiev-
ing this. The study concludes that ‘Where conditions
were such as to allow primary group life to function
smoothly, and where the primary group developed a
high degree of cohesion, morale was high and resist-
ance effective or at least very determined, regardless
in the main of the political attitudes of the soldiers’
(Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 314–315). Similarly to
loyalty, the effectiveness rested on primary group
functioning which could only be compared to one’s
family back home. According to Stouffer (1949),
this especially mattered in combat situations, where
all the primary needs of the individual are being
denied. 
While cohesion can prevent protest as a subver-
sive activity which might hurt the group, cohesion
can also foster protest, depending on the situation
and the norm within the group. In fact, group cohe-
sion is one of the necessary ingredients of collective
action (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). 
Discipline and authoritarianism. Lang (1965)
stressed that discipline concerns respect for orders,
acceptance of authority and punishment for unruly
behaviour (see Donohue [1993] for a detailed dis-
cussion on the meaning of military discipline).
Importantly, while Donohue (1993) argues that the
nature of military discipline has been changing, irre-
spective of the way we conceive it, obedience
remains one of its key elements. For the soldier at the
bottom of the command chain this means that he, or
she, has ‘no recourse but to obey; discipline is his pri-
mary virtue. His judgment concerns only how to
overcome the external difficulties he encounters in
the execution of orders’ (Lang, 1965: 852). 
Soeters and Recht (1998) found that even in
cases where the formal discipline does not enjoy
much value, informal group norms matter a lot and
general military discipline alternates with self-steer-
ing through informal group norms. The conse-
quences of this is that ‘the hierarchical military
environment, notwithstanding a formally rigid com-
mand structure, places a high premium on flexibility
and initiative within the limits of that command
structure’ (Lang, 1965: 851). 
Concerning protest, we can conclude that in this
kind of organization, engaging in behaviour which
does not correspond to general norms of behaviour
is difficult. Even if the exact rules might not ban cer-
tain protest actions, informal norms of behaviour
which go together with discipline might have the
same suppressive result. 
Bureaucracy and hierarchy. Ever since Weber
used the Prussian military as a prototype of a bureau-
cracy, military organizations have been hailed for
their bureaucratic model of organizational behav-
iour. According to Janowitz and Little (1965: 27),
‘the career soldier is assumed to be an ideal example
of the professional operating under bureaucratic
authority’. While the bureaucratic modes of organi-
zation have changed greatly in the meantime,
bureaucracy persists – ‘It is difficult to imagine how
soldiers would be recruited, trained, and deployed
without a supportive bureaucratic apparatus’
(Shields, 2003: 181). 
Yet, while some might note that all modern
organizations rest on a higher or lower level of
bureaucratic organization, it is important to high-
light the specific nature of military bureaucracy.
Drawing on Adler and Borys’s (1996) distinction
between coercive and enabling bureaucracies, Soeters
et al. (2006: 242) highlight the coercive nature of the
military bureaucracy when compared to business
organizations. In particular, they refer to the higher
level of power distance and rule orientation found in
military academies. 
For those facing bureaucracy and hierarchy, there
are often consequences if they want to voice com-
plaints outside the prescribed hierarchic structure.
Lang (1965: 855) wrote that the ‘hierarchical com-
mand authority as a rule is highly suspicious of
granting lower-level participants the right to appeal
outside of regular command channels’. Chief reasons
for this are the possible disruptive consequences for
military discipline and effectiveness. In addition to
this, Lang cites Evan (1962), who found that when
there are individuals or institutions which personnel
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can complain to, many have internal constraints
from doing so – especially if such instances even
indirectly form a part of the military hierarchy – as
they still symbolize authority. At the same time,
Lang (1965) maintains, those forming the instances
where personnel can complain, if a part of the mili-
tary hierarchy themselves, will not readily take nec-
essary action, in order to avoid endangering the
organization which is ultimately important for their
own position.
Legal position and restrictions regarding
protest. In all Western democracies, military person-
nel enjoy a specific legal position. They are subject to
various rules and regulations different from the civil-
ian mainstream (think for instance of the military
law system or separate health care arrangements).
One of the recurrent elements of this specific posi-
tion concerns limitations on labour rights and polit-
ical behaviour. While it is not our aim to provide an
extensive overview of the exact rules in different
countries regarding specific activities, a rough pat-
tern can be discerned. In general, military personnel
have fewer options available than most other citizens
and the options they do have tend to be less effective. 
For instance, while Western democracies some-
times do allow unionization, even when it is permit-
ted a number of limitations on specific activities tend
to hollow out this right. Striking, normally a key
pressure tool of trade unions, is nearly always forbid-
den (Hummel, 2014; Nolte and Krieger, 2003: 84).
Other activities such as demonstrating or petitioning
are allowed in a number of countries, but can often
be applied with more restrictions than for other citi-
zens. If we consider general political rights, the ten-
dency is similar and the political neutrality of
military personnel is highly valued although exact
regulations tend to vary from extreme restrictions
(such as in Spain or France) to tolerance of political
activities as long as the military service is not imped-
ed (such as in Germany or the Netherlands) (see
Leigh and Born, 2008). 
Understanding discontent and protest in
the military context: psychological
contract and beyond
While protest was never a prominent element in the
literature on the military profession, the manner in
which discontent is dealt with within Western mili-
tary organizations has been clearly outlined. This
arrangement is commonly referred to as the psycho-
logical (Bartle, 2006a) or social contract (Farley et
al., 2006: 67), and in Great Britain as a segment of
the military covenant (Tipping, 2008). In organiza-
tional science literature the psychological contract is
a well-established concept which denotes subjective
beliefs regarding an unwritten agreement about
mutual obligations between an employee and an
organization (Rousseau, 1989). The literature on the
military defines the specific form of psychological
contract in the military organization as a two-sided
arrangement. On the one hand, military personnel
fulfil demanding and sometimes dangerous duties
while facing cultural and legal restrictions to their
political and labour rights. On the other hand, the
employer protects military personnel more than is
the case in common civilian organizations, by shield-
ing them from market forces and providing for a sta-
ble socio-economic position. 
Inevitably, just like in every other organization,
military personnel might sometimes face a crisis or a
problematic situation which causes discontent, no
matter how well things are arranged. In such
instances of discontent, personnel will weather the
difficulties, remain loyal to their employer and
refrain from protest not only because protest is diffi-
cult, but also because in the greater picture, their
employer is also loyal to them and deserves recipro-
cal loyalty. 
The transformative processes which culminated
after the end of the Cold War have a direct influence
on the psychological contract, chiefly by removing
the stability and the guaranteed socio-economic
position of military personnel but also by numerous
other changes within the organization and the mili-
tary profession. There are warnings that this psycho-
logical contract might collapse in numerous
countries (see for instance, Bartle, 2006a), which
brings forth the idea that military personnel might
get more assertive, as long predicted by Moskos
(1977). The question of whether and how the behav-
iour of personnel might change once the psycholog-
ical contract is under pressure or disintegrates
completely can only be answered by consulting
empirical evidence, to which we turn in the next sec-
tion. 
Empirical section: Evidence on 
discontent and protest in the military
In this section we review studies which provide evi-
dence on discontent and protest within the military.
We distinguish between three major topics – studies
on labour relations and unionism, studies on anti-
war protest within, and studies focused on diversity
issues including gender, ethnic/racial and sexual
minorities. 
Labour relations, trade unions and
protest
Forming associations in order to protect the interests
of employees was a crucial tool in the social struggles
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during much of the 20th century (Streeck, 2005).
The fact that military personnel in many countries
did not participate in this historical development
was one of the important divisions between them
and the rest of the labour force. Subsequently, the
issue of unionization of military personnel became a
topic of interest, among both policy makers and
scholars. Most research focuses on the question of
whether and how the possibility of unionization was
offered to military personnel, while engaging in
actual union activities is addressed only occasionally. 
The discussion on unionization within the mili-
tary first fired up in the 1970s as an element of
Moskos’s notion of a switch towards an occupation-
al model of organization within the military. A good
overview of the developments and the arguments in
the discussion of the 1970s can be found in the study
by Mittelstadt (2011), where she describes what
turned out to be the failed attempt to unionize the
US military. At the time, congressional budgetary
cuts and the general move towards an occupational
model of organization led to calls for the unioniza-
tion of military personnel. These attempts ‘generated
a furor. Pollsters frantically registered public opinion
on the matter; Congress called hearings; Presidents
Ford and then Carter weighed in immediately; and
military leadership became, in the words of one
observer, hysterical’ (Mittelstadt, 2011: 29–30).
Mittelstadt argues that the attempt to unionize
inserted extra drama into the serious question of
whether the new volunteer military is a job just like
any other or still a calling. Military leadership was
afraid of the consequences for discipline, readiness
and national security. In the end, the proposed
unionization was defeated by renewed political sup-
port for the military budgets and the benefits for
military personnel and their families. In other coun-
tries, such as Canada and Great Britain, similar
pushes for unionization were addressed by forming
alternative bodies for dispute resolution, yet short of
association.
Internationally, Harries-Jenkins (1977) argued
that the push towards unionization in most cases
came from the increased feeling that the military’s
social standing and rights have been endangered. At
the same time, arguments against independent trade
unions were proclaimed in many countries – largely
based on the fact that the military profession is pro-
foundly different from civilian professions,  with the
possible consequences of unionization including a
breakdown of discipline, undermining of the mili-
tary authority structure and subversion of the politi-
cal control (for a detailed discussion on historical
arguments against unionization of military person-
nel see Caforio, 2006: 314–316).
As already stipulated, after the failed, but tumul-
tuous attempt to unionize personnel, the United
States reinforced the socio-economic position of mil-
itary personnel, thereby strengthening the psycho-
logical contract and delaying the effects of the
organizational model. However, when the Cold War
was ending, in many other countries the strategic
incentives to invest in such arrangements disap-
peared. 
Bartle and Heinecken’s (2006) comparative vol-
ume on military unionism in the West highlights a
distinction between three groups of countries.
Countries like France, Italy and Spain forbid mili-
tary personnel to join or form military unions – their
interests are protected by the commanding officer or
state itself. In countries such as Slovenia, South
Africa and Ireland, military trade unions have been
introduced in recent decades. In countries such as
the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, military
unions have been allowed for a longer period of time.
In general, the role of the unions is to bargain with
the employer, but, as in the Dutch case, they some-
times also protect the individual interests of the
employees. The key message of  Bartle and
Heinecken’s (2006) volume is that regardless of the
status of unionization, the situation of military per-
sonnel seems to be similar across the Western world,
and can best be described as precarious, both in
terms of socio-economic pressures as well as the lack
of a clear route to deal with these pressures. 
The similarities in pressures but also the increased
internationalization are mirrored in the activities of
the European organization of military associations,
EUROMIL, which aims to support the social rights
of soldiers at the European level but also pressure
governments to ‘to lift all existing restrictions rights
of soldiers which are not an inevitably and propor-
tionate result from the military assignment’
(EUROMIL, 2017). 
On the individual level, Heinecken’s (2009:
493–494) international comparative study among
middle-ranking officers found that the introduction
of business-like practices in order to improve effi-
ciency, cost-effectiveness and flexibility changed the
way officers see their profession and the relationship
with their employer. Heinecken concludes that these
reforms undermined the traditional values which
included selfless service, loyalty and commitment. In
addition to that, changes caused officers to stop
trusting military leadership when it comes to defend-
ing officers’ interests. This in turn led military per-
sonnel to consider other possibilities when it comes
to influencing their position, for instance unioniza-
tion in situations where this was previously not the
case, but also to consider other forms of applying
pressure. Still this is more of a prediction than reali-
ty as there is very little evidence for increased
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activism. In France, for instance, the military is 
commonly known as Le Grande Muette (‘the big
silent one’). Officers are not supposed to engage in
politics and the civil domain has a clear dominance
over the military one (Cogan, 2003: 158). In the
1950s and early 1960s this changed – the French
army went from obedience to mutiny, but in the
period afterwards the silent and obedient position of
the French armed forces was restored and lasts to the
present day. 
Similar patterns are present in other countries –
military personnel rarely resort to protest. Some
authors however take a more normative turn and
argue that the time might be ripe to break this pat-
tern. In Great Britain, Strachan (2003) proposes
increased politicization in order to strengthen the
position of the military personnel versus the political
leadership. Strachan sees the need to breach the
mode of silence which, especially in a media-driven
world, leads to servicemen and women being unable
to express their views. He questions the depoliticized
manners of the servicemen and women and points
out that, historically, issues which endangered pro-
fessional interests used to be addressed by briefing
the press and blackmailing politicians (Strachan,
2003: 54–55). In the US, Sarkesian (1998: 425)
made a similar argument and cited General
Ridgeway, who proclaimed that no military leader
should forget that he or she is a citizen first and sol-
dier second, meaning that he or she has a duty to
warn politicians and the people of problems they see.
The years of austerity and the introduction of flexi-
ble and short-term contracts in Europe might have
produced the effect of increased politicization – with
street demonstrations of military personnel and mil-
itary retirees occurring in Greece, Spain, Germany
and the Netherlands (see EUROMIL, 2015, 2016). 
Yet, the existing empirical evidence shows that
military personnel remain largely passive when it
comes to defending their labour rights. Even when
unionization is allowed, the typical ways of fighting
for labour issues remain out of reach for military per-
sonnel in most Western democracies. 
Anti-war protest in the military 
Historically, combat refusal is probably the most
common expression of dissent within the military.
Recently, collective refusals to engage in combat were
often closely related to broader social movements
which agitated against war in various Western coun-
tries. 
Kriner and Shen (2010) found that military casu-
alties in the United States lead to drop of support for
military operations, particularly within the groups
which have felt the costs of war directly. However,
these costs are often felt in disadvantaged communi-
ties with fewer political assets and less leverage. Levy
(2013) draws on Hirschman’s (1970) thesis that
voice is more likely when exit is not an option, such
as when conscription is obligatory. Levy (2013) com-
pares two anti-war mothers movements – an
American and an Israeli one – and argues that even
though the Israeli movement faced a situation which
was, compared to the American situation, ‘less con-
venient in terms of opportunity structure and the
politics of war, the recruitment-related variables
tipped the scale. Due to these variables, the move-
ment could rely on middle-class resources and
power, favor voice over exit, and, mainly, perfect the
framing of republican motherhood and adhere to it
in a manner that was instrumental in mobilizing
support. An initial social-base supportive of this
protest constrained the movement to keep its rela-
tively mainstream tone, thanks to which it became
very effective’ (Levy, 2013: 37).
In the United States, memories are still alive of
the massive protest activities by conscripted soldiers
during the Vietnam War (see Cortright and Zinn,
2013; Foley, 2003; Moser, 1996). Nowadays, there is
no draft, and even though a direct comparison is dif-
ficult it seems that the protest activities within the
military are less common than during the Vietnam
War. Yet, protest does occur, as seen in the testi-
monies provided first hand by both families (Leitz,
2014) and military personnel themselves (Gutmann,
2010; Levinson, 2014). 
In sum, the evidence shows that the removal of
conscription might have made protest more difficult.
Yet, under the right circumstances protest can still
appear, as seen during the unpopular Iraq War. 
Diversity and protest
Literature focusing on diversity occasionally touches
upon the issue of protest in addition to its main
focus on organizational policies and external societal
pressures. Within Western militaries, diversity usual-
ly concerns three broad groups – ethno-religious (or
racial) minorities, women and LGBTs (Van der
Meulen and Soeters, 2007).
The earliest discussion on diversity centred on
the inclusion of minority ethnic and racial groups. In
the United States, the struggle for the emancipation
of African Americans within the US military was
embedded within the general civil rights movement
and in the conflicts leading up to it and included a
full repertoire of protest activities which in concert
with the broader social movements led to racial inte-
gration (see Binkin, 2011; Nalty, 1989). In Europe,
similar issues appeared only after the arrival of a large
number of non-European immigrants after the
Second World War, which raised the question of
inclusion of these minorities (see Winslow et al.,
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2006). However, given the specific history and legal
position of these minorities, the processes seen in the
US throughout the 20th century did not occur. In
this case, diversity is commonly approached in terms
of organizational needs rather than activism and
protest.
The inclusion of women in the military organiza-
tion often produced conflict. Katzenstein (1999)
focused on women’s movements inside the military
and the church and found that military women pur-
sue unique ways of struggling against discrimination,
in particular by turning to courts and political bod-
ies. Carreiras (2008) compares the Dutch and
Portuguese situations with a focus on the problems
faced by military women seeking gender integration.
She identifies four strategies women apply, and finds
that the strategy of conformism – belief that gender
differences should be minimized and excessive visi-
bility should be avoided – is most commonly
employed. Other strategies, assimilation, adapting to
the military ways and in a way beating the men at
their own game, complicity, remaining loyal while
preserving the gender differences and femininity,
and assertivity, where women want to preserve the
gender difference in an emancipatory sense by
employing voice to channel their demands, are far
less common. Notably, increased acceptance of
women within the military has also led some men to
rebel. Miller (1997) presents evidence on how men
use anti-social behaviour – chiefly harassment – to
protest the increased presence of women, which they
perceive as threatening. 
In the United States, the position of LGBTs with-
in society was a contentious political issue for
decades (Fetner, 2008). Direct protest by LGBT ser-
vicemen was long impossible, as the Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell (DADT) policy required openly declared
LGBTs to leave the organization. Eventually, exter-
nal pressures and the success of the political allies of
the LGBT community lead to the removal of dis-
criminatory policies. In many other Western coun-
tries, the issue of LGBTs within the military
organization was not as politicized as in the United
States, issues of harassment and inclusion certainly
did and continue to exist (see, for example, a quali-
tative study by Bullinga [1984] on the Dutch mili-
tary in the conscription period). A more recent
example by Richardson and Bosch (2002) shows that
the activism of minority groups within the Dutch
military is nowadays formalized in networks of
LGBTs, women and ethnic minorities, whose activi-
ties include information days and symposia where
issues are discussed and communicated to policy
makers and the organization – reflective of broader
societal trends. Similar networks exist in other coun-
tries as well, for example Great Britain and Australia. 
In sum, we can conclude that when protest
regarding diversity takes place, it is often an 
organization-friendly, cooperative approach.
Confrontation rarely takes place and tends to be
effective when external allies can support it – in par-
ticular policy makers and general public opinion.
Assessment of research to date 
Literature on behaviour within organizations stresses
that remaining passive is the most common response
to discontent among employees (see Kolarska and
Aldrich, 1980). Unsurprisingly, the same can be said
of the military, which is famously hostile towards
contentious behaviour. Our review shows that while
protest is not completely absent within the military,
it remains an exceptional form of behaviour. 
There is a large consensus in the literature that
the arrangement governing the position of military
personnel has been threatened by the numerous
changes in the military organization. Looking at the
consequences of these changes, some authors
hypothesized that both socio-economic pressures
and the increasing convergence with the civilian
mainstream might cause more activism among mili-
tary personnel (Heinecken, 2009; Moskos, 1977).
The empirical evidence does not unequivocally con-
firm such a trend, however. Certainly, there is some
evidence of growing dissatisfaction and also of more
opportunities to express that dissatisfaction. For
example, in recent decades more countries have
begun to allow trade unions for military personnel.
Still, collective protest as a form of behaviour among
military personnel remains rare. In fact, there is evi-
dence that the changes within the military organiza-
tion might have suppressed protest rather than
encouraged it, as seen in the removal of conscription
and the subsequent decrease of contact with the
more rebellious segments of the general population.
Moreover, the changes which make protest easier
should not be overstated – both legal limitations and
unique cultural traits specific for the military persist,
especially regarding behaviour which could endanger
key military tasks: take for example the limitations
on striking, normally a crucial tool in civilian labour
relations, which remain firmly in place in almost
every Western democracy. 
When protest behaviour does take place, it often
concerns the issues of diversity and to some extent
the anti-war movements – probably because these
issues figure prominently in public debate within the
civilian society. The forms of protest which are
applied usually suit the specific organizational set-
ting of the military. However, the developments out-
side the organization matter as well. Studies which
11
Petrovic and van Stekelenburg Protest in Western militaries
investigated the instances of activism within the 
military highlight the importance of external allies
which can assert influence on policy makers. Such
allies are able to inject their resources and have expe-
rience with similar issues in other settings, thereby
aiding those within the military. Notably, not much
has been written about the relationship between mil-
itary trade unions and the civilian labour movement,
nor about the support for the position of military
personnel by the labour movement. The lack of such
a relationship might be a part of the explanation for
the relative passivity when it comes to socio-econom-
ic issues within the military. At the same time, the
protests which occurred in recent years in Europe are
yet to be addressed by the literature. 
In sum, the existing literature enables us to
understand the organizational context of the military
and the ways it might suppress protest. We also have
a fairly good picture of the salient issues among per-
sonnel and the way they are addressed. Yet, based on
the current state of research, the most important
conclusion about protest within the military con-
cerns the things we do not know. This knowledge
gap can be summarized in two main points: the lack
of empirical research and the missing link between
military-specific research and the mainstream socio-
logical and organizational science literature. 
The lack of  empirical research
While the literature largely agrees on the nature of
pressures faced by military personnel and some
empirical evidence has been presented about the dis-
content among them, a number of crucial issues
remain unresolved – chiefly because they haven’t
been researched properly.
To begin with, no real evidence has been present-
ed on how specific aspects of the organizational
changes influence discontent among personnel and
their relationship with the employer. While Moskos
et al. (2000) stress that the transformation of the
military organization varies greatly between different
countries and even within the same military organi-
zations, there is very little evidence on how this
transformational diversity relates to work satisfac-
tion. While one could argue that downsizing and
austerity as a rule produce discontent, we must won-
der about the impact of other, less material aspects of
the transformation of the military organization. As
such changes might place traditional military norms
under pressure, the question is whether this could
have unintended consequences and indeed lead
towards more non-traditional behaviour.
Regrettably, if we focus on the reaction of military
personnel when under pressure, particularly in terms
of protest, we face an even bigger lacuna. While the
turn towards trade unions has been a hypothesized
result of the transformation of the military and we
indeed know a bit about trade unions within the
military organization, evidence on the opinions of
personnel about unionization, membership rates and
readiness to engage in union-related activities is non-
existent or difficult to find. Subsequently, protest
behaviour, in the case of labour conflicts usually
organized by trade unions, remains under-researched
as well. 
The lack of  a link to findings from other
fields 
The second major problem concerns the lack of a
connection between the existing research on protest-
related issues within the military and the literature
on similar topics within other types of organizations
and spheres of life. While this isolation can partially
be attributed to mainstream academia which nowa-
days commonly ignores the military organization
(Malešević, 2010; Zürcher, 2013), our review shows
that military sociologists do not invest enough effort
into understanding how the developments within
the military relate to trends described in other sec-
tors. 
For example, ever since the 1970s military-specif-
ic literature has focused on the increased interest in
trade unions by military personnel. At the same
time, we know that trade unions in other sectors are
going through a difficult period with severe conse-
quences on their ability to attract membership as
well as influence policy makers (Streeck, 2005). No
attempt has been made to relate this profound crisis
to developments within the military and the
attempts to spread unionization among military per-
sonnel. Subsequently, questions on whether military
trade unions are an exception or whether they will
follow suit of other sectors remain unresolved. 
More broadly, issues such as discontent, protest
and trade unions are rarely observed in comparison
to other organizations where personnel face similar
constraints, such as the police or medical services.
Besides sharing a number of aspects of their organi-
zational culture (Soeters et al., 2006), military organ-
izations in the Western world face pressures such as
austerity and increased focus on efficiency, which are
in fact typical for many other public institutions.
Failure to observe military personnel in comparison
to other (public) employees results in a profound
lack of understanding of not only the effects of the
developments within the military on the behaviour
of personnel but also the effects of the specific orga-
nizational characteristics when facing these develop-
ments.
Future research
In this final section we aim to address the two limi-
tations in our knowledge on protest within the mili-
tary – the lack of empirical research and the lack of a
link to the findings and developments in other
spheres of life. We see the need to investigate specif-
ic and urgent questions and propose a path to do so
by leaning on both the existing knowledge on mili-
tary affairs and abundant research from outside the
military. 
A framework for research on protest
within the military organization
Empirical evidence shows that, within the military,
protest is rare. When it does occur its form is often
adapted to the specific organizational circumstances.
Hence, it makes sense to observe collective protest as
only one of the possible strategies when coping with
discontent, especially since a similar approach is
commonly applied when studying activism in the
wider society. Wright et al. (1990) noted that dis-
gruntled citizens at first have a choice between
remaining passive or engaging in some kind of
action. When they engage in action, they can do that
individually or collectively. Collective action itself
can be normative and take place within the norm of
the law (for example taking part in a legal demon-
stration) or non-normative (for example illegal
protest). Evidence shows that in the civilian world
the choice to protest is made only occasionally, as
other reactions, such as remaining passive, are more
prevalent (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). This has been
recognized within organizational settings where
studies commonly apply the framework which has
been proposed by Hirschman (1970) and later
expanded on in numerous empirical studies on
employee behaviour. Hirschman (1970) identified
two key sorts of behavioural strategies, voice – com-
municating the need for change – and exit – leaving
the problematic situation altogether. Importantly,
while not the direct focus of this article, exit is an
option which is routinely and extensively investigat-
ed within the military organization – chiefly because
it has enormous impact on its functioning. The
choice between exit and voice can be influenced by
loyalty – the feeling of commitment which can pro-
vide for the readiness to endure the problematic sit-
uation and stick with the organization – but also by
a great number of other demographic and personal
variables. Later, more refined applications of
Hirschman’s framework commonly included behav-
iour defined as silence – ‘the intentional, conscious
decision of employees to withhold their opinions
and concerns about organizational circumstances’
(Bell et al., 2011: 135) – but also neglect, which
refers to anti-organizational or anti-social behaviour
such as investing less effort into work or causing
damage to the employer (Farrell, 1983). Importantly,
neglect can also refer to bullying, which was in fact
identified as a form of protest by military personnel
in a study by Miller (1997). 
Applying Hirschman’s framework and its more
recent variations within the military setting might be
useful as it could provide us with a better under-
standing of the behaviour of military personnel and
allow for a meaningful comparison with studies from
numerous other fields of life. In addition to the usual
factors which influence individuals’ behaviour, such
as demography and personal experiences, special
attention should be given to understanding how spe-
cific elements of the military context influence the
decision whether and how to engage in protest or
other types of behaviour. It is often mentioned that
the military context is a protest-unfriendly environ-
ment but we do not know much about how different
elements of this environment work to suppress
protest and in which ways they could influence alter-
native forms of behaviour such as exit or neglect. For
example, cohesion is a typically military characteris-
tic which can work to prevent protest but is at the
same time also its necessary ingredient. A better
understanding of this and similar issues has in fact
value which extends far beyond military-specific
studies. 
Regrettably, insights from the military organiza-
tion are often overlooked. From the 1970s on, the
classical focus on the military has all but disappeared
and the military as organization has been neglected
by mainstream sociologists (Malešević, 2010). While
the military organization itself could always count
on sustained policy-driven research on its effective-
ness and deployment (Haltiner and Kümmel, 2009:
75), military personnel’s welfare was rarely a subject
of academic research. For example, labour force
research routinely omitted military personnel, based
on the argument that they form an institutionalized
population, subject to different constraints and
choices than other employees (Booth and Segal,
2005). That is a pity, as, even today, many other
organizations share at least some of the typical mili-
tary aspects such as discipline, high cohesion or spe-
cific legal restrictions. Think of the police force, the
ambulance service, fire fighters but also of other pro-
fessions with a strong professional culture and feeling
of separateness. Shedding more light on the issue of
protest within the military might be a valuable con-
tribution towards understanding why some groups
of citizens face difficulties expressing their discontent
in an effective way. Furthermore, while changes in
the military organization might be having unique
consequences because of the specific position of 
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military personnel, understanding and comparing
them to similar developments, especially in the pub-
lic sector, might provide us with a better understand-
ing of how different segments of the public sector in
Western democracies are transforming themselves.
Finally, while the military organization has been
under pressure, Western societies tend to ask more
and more of their military personnel – making the
mission to understand their position important for
both their welfare as well as our own security.
Annotated further reading
The following article and two books offer insights on the
processes of change within military organizations: 
Moskos CC (1977) From institution to occupation:
Trends in military organization. Armed Forces and
Society 4(1): 41–50. 
Farrell T and Terriff T (2002) The Sources of Military
Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. London: Lynne
Rienner.
Moskos CC, Williams JA and Segal DR (2000) The
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War.
Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand.
The following book and article provide a good overview
on trade unionism within military organizations:
Bartle R and Heinecken L (eds) (2006) Military
Unionism in the Post Cold War Era. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Mittelstadt J (2011) ‘The army is a service, not a job’:
Unionization, employment, and the meaning of mili-
tary service in the late-twentieth century United
States. International Labor and Working-Class History
80(1): 29–52.
The following two articles and book are suggested read-
ing on discontent and protest within military organiza-
tions: 
Heinecken L (2009) Discontent within the ranks?
Officers’ attitudes toward military employment and
representation – a four-country comparative study.
Armed Forces and Society 35(3): 477–500. 
Levy Y (2013) How military recruitment affects collec-
tive action and its outcomes. International Studies
Quarterly 57(1): 28–40.
Levinson N (2014) War is Not a Game: The New
Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
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résumé Bien que les manifestations au sein des armées occidentales soient rares, cela ne veut pas dire
que le personnel militaire n’éprouve pas du mécontentement. La transformation des organisations
militaires depuis la fin de la guerre froide a poussé le personnel militaire à faire face à un certain nombre
de pressions socio-économiques. Malgré ces pressions, le personnel militaire évolue dans un environnent
de travail particulier rendant leur cas particulier. En effet, la culture au sein des organisations militaires et
leur cadre légal rendent les manifestations plus difficiles à réaliser que dans d’autres milieux. Dans ce
travail de recherche, nous intégrons les littératures sur la transformation des armées occidentales et sur
l’environnent particulier des organisations militaires avec des données empiriques de cas de
manifestations parmi le personnel militaire. En faisant un bilan de la recherche existante, nous identifions
plusieurs lacunes et proposons un cadre pour analyser les manifestations au sein des armées occidentales.
mots-clés austérité ◆ organisations militaires ◆ protestation ◆ réclamations ◆ syndicats
resumen Aunque recurrir a la protesta no es frecuente por parte del personal militar de las democracias
occidentales, esto no implica la ausencia de malestar o descontento. Especialmente, a partir de la
intensificación de las presiones socioeconómicas y las transformaciones sufridas por la organización
militar como consecuencia de la Guerra Fría. Cuando se enfrentan a estos retos, el personal militar opera
dentro de un contexto concreto en el que una cultura militar única y un marco legal específico a menudo
hacen que la participación en la protesta sea más difícil que en otros sectores sociales. Esta investigación
integra la literatura basada en la transformación del personal militar occidental a través de un contexto
único de organización militar y mediante evidencias empíricas de protestas en el sector. De esta forma, se
evalúan las evidencias observadas hasta el momento, se identifican las limitaciones de la investigación
para, finalmente, proponer un marco de estudio para la investigación de las protestas del personal militar
en democracias occidentales.
palabras clave austeridad ◆ organización militar ◆ protesta ◆ quejas ◆ sindicatos 
